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This paper focuses on the contribution to recent narrowing of the gap between Northern and Southern
economies in GDP/capita, shares in world trade and market capitalization attributable both jointly
and single to China, India, and Brazil (the three currently largest rapidly growing Southern economies).
We report North￿South differences in GDP/capita which (depending slightly on definition of North
and South, as well as price deflators used) fall from 22 to 15.9 in constant USD between 1990 and
2009, changing Northern and Southern shares in world trade which fall for the North from 82.3% to
64.4% and rise for the South from 17.7% to 35.6%, and a changing North￿-South gap in stock market
capitalizations from 27.6 to 3.3 over the same time. In contrast the North￿-China gap falls from 57.2
to 13.1 between 1990 and 2009, and India from 70.4 to 38.1 using market exchange rates and from
23.4 to 5.5 for China and from 20.7 to 11.4 for India using PPP rates. We calculate the portions of
North￿-South gap change after 1990 which is accounted for by growth individually and jointly of China,
India, and Brazil. Our calculations show that the majority of the change occurs from growth in these
three economies, and the most from China. We suggest that the conventional view of a North￿-South
bipolar world may need recasting into a tripolar world of the North, the Large South, and the rest of
the South. In this, world manufacturing activity, trade, and even more rapidly, market capitalization
are gravitating towards the Large Three, with a narrowing South￿-Large Three gap as well as a shrinking
North￿-Large Three gap.
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parity  (constant  2005  international  $)  rates.  Even  more  rapidly  changing  are  the 
Southern shares in world stock market capitalization and in world trade.   
In  addition,  interactions  among  the  large  Southern  economies  are 
proceeding  even  more  quickly  than  these  changes.  Wang  and  Whalley  (2011) 


















effectively  divides  the  world  between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  Wealthy  developed 






Northern.  The  terms  North  and  South  thus  need  careful  definition.  Commonly, 
developed  countries  are  referred  as  the  North  and  others  as  the  South  (see 
Dinopoulos  &  Segerstrom,  2006;  Ratna,  2009,  and  etc);  but  as  OECD  (2006) 













                                                        
1 The North-South debate, as it came to be known during the 1970s, was essentially over the policy changes that 
would enable the South to rapidly achieve self-sustaining economic growth and industrialization (Adam Sneyd, 
http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/glossary_entry.jsp?id=CO.0063). The term North- South became popularly 
used after the publication in 1980 of ‘The Brandt Report’ (The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1987). 
2 The main criteria seemingly used by the WEO to classify the world into advanced and emerging/developing 
economies are: (1) per capita income, (2) degree of export diversification--so oil exporters that have high per 
capita GDP do not make the advanced classification because around 70% of exports are oil, and (3) degree of 
integration into the global financial system. Under the first criteria, they look at an average over a number of years 
given that volatility (due to say oil production) can have a marked year-to-year effect. These are not the only 
factors considered in deciding the classification of countries. The WEO Statistical Appendix states "Rather than 
being based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, this classification has evolved over time with the objective of 
facilitating analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful organization of data." Reclassification only happens 
when something marked changes or the case for change becomes overwhelming. For example, Malta joining the 
euro area was a significant change in circumstances that warranted a reclassification from an emerging and 
developing economy to an advanced economy. See http://forums.imf.org/showthread.php?t=154 




Latina  America,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  USSR,  and  Africa.  He  reports 
GDP/capita for the “Rich”, the “Rest” as well as subgroups and a Rich/Rest spread 




















Table 2-1: North-South Gaps in GDP/Capita in Constant 2000 USD between 1990 and 2009 
Using IMF Country Classifications 
Gap\Year  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North/South  22.1  21.7   21.2   21.1  21.0  20.4  19.7  19.0  18.2   17.3   16.6  15.9 
North/Large Three  39.3 31.9 28.9    27.8 26.6 25.4 24.2 22.8 21.4    19.7    18.3 16.6 
North/China  57.2  36.4   28.6   26.7  24.9  23.0  21.6  19.9  18.1   16.2   14.8  13.1 
North/India  70.4  64.4   59.8   58.2  57.4  54.4  52.2  49.4  46.7   44.0   42.2  38.1 
North/Brazil  6.7 6.6    7.3    7.4 7.3 7.5 7.3 7.3 7.3    7.0    6.7 6.5 
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Table 2-2: North-South Gaps in GDP/Capita between the 1960s and 2000s Using IMF 
Country Classifications 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s  1980s  1990s  2000s     
In Constant 2000 USD 
In PPP (Constant 2005 
International $)   
North/South  12.5    24.0 23.4 21.7 19.0  10.5  9.1  7.9 
North-Large Three  23.1    43.9 39.2 33.6 23.2  16.6  13.8  9.4 
North-China  57.7   105.7 71.7  40.4  20.7  29.4  16.6  8.6 
North-India  27.4    69.1 72.2 65.6 50.2  21.2  19.3  14.9 
North-Brazil  3.3    5.5 5.6 6.8 7.2  3.0  3.7  3.9 





Three  gaps  in  GDP/capita  narrowed  after  1990,  especially  in  recent  years.  The 
G7‐Large Three gap narrowed by 59% from 44.4 to 18.2 between 1990 and 2009, 
while China narrowing its gap with the G7 by 78% over the same time. The picture 
revealed  for  gap  between  the  Rest  of  the  North  and  the  Large  Three  is  similar. 
Though the Rest of North experienced faster growth in GDP/capita than the G7, its 
difference with China still narrowed by over 74% over 1990 to 2009. 
  6 
Table 2-3: The G7-South and Rest of North-South Gaps in GDP/Capita in Constant 2000 
USD between 1990 and 2009 Using IMF Country Classifications 
Gap\Year  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
G7/South  24.9    24.4    23.7 23.5 23.3 22.7 21.9 21.1 20.2    19.1    18.3 17.5 
G7/Large Three  44.4 35.9 32.2 31.0 29.7 28.2 26.9 25.3 23.7    21.7    20.2 18.2 
G7/China  64.6    40.9    31.9 29.8 27.7 25.6 24.0 22.0 20.0    17.9    16.3 14.4 
G7/India  79.5    72.3    66.8 64.9 63.9 60.6 58.1 54.8 51.8    48.6    46.5 42.0 
G7/Brazil  7.5   7.5   8.2  8.2  8.2  8.3  8.1  8.1  8.1   7.8   7.4  7.2 
Rest  of  North/South  13.6    13.8 13.9 13.9 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.9 12.5 12.0    11.7 11.3 
Rest  of  North/Large  Three 24.2 20.3 18.9 18.4 17.8 17.0 16.3 15.5 14.7 13.7    12.9 11.7 
Rest  of  North/China  35.3    23.1    18.7 17.7 16.6 15.4 14.5 13.5 12.4    11.3    10.4  9.3 
Rest  of  North/India  43.4    40.8    39.2 38.4 38.3 36.4 35.2 33.5 32.1    30.6    29.7 27.1 
Rest  of  North/Brazil  4.1   4.2   4.8  4.9  4.9  5.0  4.9  5.0  5.0   4.9   4.7  4.6 










$12,196  or  higher.  The  United  Nation  Development  Programme  (UNDP,  2010) 
classifies countries into four groups according to their human development levels but 




country  grouping  similar  to  the  UNDP  but  does  not  explicitly  state  its  criteria  in 
classifying countries.  
In addition, we also consider the North as high income countries following 
the  World  Bank  and  the  UNDP  as  Very  High  HDI  economies.  We  then  use  two 
additional  classifications  of  countries  for  sensitivity  purposes.  One  takes  OECD 
                                                        
1 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. 
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members as the North.  The other takes Oil Exporters as defined above and  IMF 




Table 2-4: The North-South Gap in GDP/Capita between the 1960s and Today in Current 
USD Using Different Country and Group Classifications 
Classification  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
IMF  14.4 17.0 19.2 22.5 17.9 21.8  23.1  21.2  17.9  16.0  14.3  12.7  12.7 
World Bank  11.5  13.6  16.7  22.3  18.2 21.7 22.8 21.5 18.3 16.3 14.6 13.0 12.7 
UNDP    10.2 13.6 16.1 17.5 13.9 18.6  17.6  15.7  14.1  12.9  11.6  10.6 9.9 
OECD as North  11.3 12.6 14.3 19.0 15.9  18.7 18.9 18.6 16.1 14.4 12.8 11.4 11.0 
Oil Exporter + IMF  10.8 14.2 16.3 17.5 13.6  18.8 17.5 15.6 13.8 12.6 11.4 10.4  9.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
 
Table  2‐4  reports  gap  measures  for  five  alternative  North  and  South 
classifications. These suggest the same trend in the North‐South gap and show little 
difference, except for the IMF based classification in the earlier years. The peak of 








IMF  country  classification  shows  a  similar  trend  to  that  measured  using  other 
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as the South in the following calculations. 
There is, however, substantial sensitivity in North‐South gap measures for 









Table 2-5: The North-South Gap in GDP/Capita (IMF Classification) Using Different Price 
Deflators and PPP Measures 
Measure  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 2000 2007 2008 2009 
North/South 
Current  USD  14.4 17.0 19.2 22.5 17.9 21.8  21.2  14.3  12.7  12.7 
Constant  2000  USD  12.5 24.0 23.4 21.7 19.0 22.1  21.2  17.3  16.6  15.9 
PPP, Current International $  NA  NA  10.8  9.3  8.0  9.2  9.2  7.1  6.8  6.5 
PPP, Constant 2005 International $  NA  NA  10.5  9.1  7.9  8.9  9.1  7.2  6.9  6.5 
North/ (South - Large Three) 
Current  USD  12.5 13.1 13.9 16.9 15.0 15.5  17.1  12.3  11.0  12.2 
Constant  2000  USD  8.6  16.4 16.9 16.4 16.5 15.6  17.1  15.6  15.4  15.4 
PPP, Current International $  NA  NA  8.1  7.2  7.0  6.6  7.6  6.5  6.2  6.2 
PPP, Constant 2005 International $  NA  NA  7.7  6.9  7.0  6.2  7.5  6.6  6.4  6.4 
G7/Large Three   
Current  USD  19.4 27.1 35.8 39.5 24.8 41.8  32.2  18.2  15.8  14.1 
Constant  2000  USD  25.6 49.7 44.5 37.8 25.7 44.4  32.2  21.7  20.2  18.2 
PPP, Current International $  NA  NA  18.1  14.8  10.0  17.5  12.6  8.4  7.8  7.0 
PPP, Constant 2005 International $  NA  NA  18.1  14.8  9.9  17.6  12.6  8.3  7.8  7.0 




here  are  comparable  to  Maddison  (2008)  but  there  are  significant  differences  in 
magnitude between the calculations. Maddison (2008) measures GDP/capita using 
different price deflators and different PPPs, and also uses a different classification of 
















Table 2-6: South-Large Three Gap in GDP/Capita between the 1960s and Today   
(Constant 2000 USD, IMF Country Classifications)   
Gap  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 
South /Large Three  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.2 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 
South/China  4.6  4.4  3.1 1.9 1.1 2.6 1.3 1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8
South/India  2.2  2.9  3.1 3.0 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.6  2.5  2.5  2.4
South/Brazil  0.3  0.2  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
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Next we turn to the contribution of China, India and Brazil to the changing 
North‐South  gap  in  GDP  per  capita.  As  the  largest  changes  in  the  North‐South 
GDP/capita gap have occurred after the 1990s, we calculate what the changes in the 





Table 2-7: Counterfactual North-South Gaps in GDP/capita in Constant 2000 USD between 
1990 and 2009 under the Hypotheses that the Large Three Grew Alternatively as the South, 
the World, the South Excluding the Large Three, and Zero after 1990 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual North/South  22.1  21.7  21.2   21.1   21.0   20.4   19.7   19.0   18.2   17.3   16.6   15.9  
Actual North/Large Three  39.3  31.9  28.9   27.8   26.6   25.4   24.2   22.8   21.4   19.7   18.3   16.6  
If GDP of the Large Three Grew as the South after 1990: 
North/South  22.1  23.0 23.1 23.3 22.8 22.1 21.5 20.8 20.1 19.5 19.3 23.0 
North/Large Three  39.3 38.4 37.2 36.8 36.5 35.4 34.1 32.7 31.3 29.7 28.4 27.1 
If GDP of the Large Three Grew as the World after 1990: 
North/South  22.1 23.3 23.7 23.9 24.2 23.8 23.3 22.9 22.4 21.9 21.5 21.4 
North/Large Three  39.3 40.3 41.2 41.3 41.2 41.1 40.8 40.6 40.2 39.8 39.3 38.8 
If GDP of the Large Three Grew as the South Excluding the Large Three after 1990: 
North/South  22.1 23.5 23.8 24.0 24.4 23.9 23.3 22.7 22.0 21.4 20.9 20.9 
North/Large Three  39.3 41.5 41.7 41.9 42.5 41.5 40.3 39.2 37.9 36.7 35.8 35.6 
If No GDP Growth for the Large Three after 1990:  
North/South in Gap/capita  22.1 24.0 25.5 25.7 26.2 25.9 25.5 25.2 24.8 24.3 23.9 23.8 
North/Large Three  39.3 45.2 54.6 55.6 56.7 58.0 60.0 61.7 63.7 65.4 65.6 63.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
 

































North‐South  and  North‐Large  Three  gaps  in  GDP/capita  show  the  same  trend  of 
decreasing  over  time  less  than  the  actual  gaps.  This  reflects  that  the  relative 
reduction of China, India and Brazil in overall GDP/capita in the South, in other words, 
a more balanced development among the Southern countries after 1990.  
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Table 2-8: Counterfactual North-South Gaps in GDP/capita in Constant 2000 USD between 
1990 and 2009 under the Hypotheses that Individual Countries Grew Alternatively as the 
World and Zero after 1990 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Gap: 
North-South  22.1  21.7  21.2   21.1   21.0   20.4   19.7   19.0   18.2   17.3   16.6   15.9  
North/Large Three  39.3  31.9  28.9   27.8   26.6   25.4   24.2   22.8   21.4   19.7   18.3   16.6  
North/China  57.2   36.4   28.6   26.7   24.9   23.0   21.6   19.9   18.1   16.2   14.8   13.1  
North/India  70.4   64.4   59.8   58.2   57.4   54.4   52.2   49.4   46.7   44.0   42.2   38.1  
North/Brazil  6.7   6.6   7.3   7.4   7.3   7.5   7.3   7.3   7.3   7.0   6.7   6.5  
If GDP of China Grew as the World after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 23.0 23.4    23.5 23.7 23.3 22.7 22.2 21.7    21.0    20.5 20.2 
North/Large Three  39.3 38.5 39.2    39.0 38.7 38.1 37.3 36.5 35.6    34.3    33.1 31.4 
North/China  57.2 57.8 58.0    57.9 57.6 57.2 56.6 56.0 55.3    54.5    53.7 52.8 
If GDP of India Grew as the World after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 21.9 21.6    21.4 21.4 20.8 20.2 19.5 18.8    17.9    17.2 16.6 
North/Large Three  39.3 32.7 30.2    29.2 28.1 26.9 25.8 24.5 23.1    21.4    20.0 18.3 
North/India  70.4 73.5 76.7    77.2 77.6 77.6 77.5 77.3 77.0    76.4    75.9 75.3 
If GDP of Brazil Grew as the World after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 21.8 21.2    21.0 20.9 20.3 19.6 18.9 18.1    17.3    16.6 16.0 
North/Large Three  39.3 32.3 28.6    27.5 26.4 25.1 24.0 22.6 21.2    19.6    18.4 16.7 
North/Brazil  6.7 6.9 7.1    7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0    7.0    6.9 6.8   
If No GDP Growth for China after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 23.3 24.0    24.1 24.4 24.0 23.5 23.0 22.4    21.8    21.2 20.9 
North/Large Three  39.3 40.0 42.9    42.8 42.6 42.3 41.7 41.1 40.4    39.1    37.8 35.5 
North/China  57.2 64.8 77.0    78.0 79.2 80.7 83.1 85.2 87.6    89.6    89.6 86.4 
If No GDP Growth for India after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 22.0 21.9    21.7 21.7 21.1 20.5 19.8 19.1    18.2    17.5 16.9 
North/Large Three  39.3 33.4 31.4    30.5 29.3 28.1 27.0 25.7 24.3    22.5    20.9 19.1 
North/India  70.4  82.5  101.8 104.1 106.6 109.5 113.8 117.6 121.8 125.7 126.7 123.3 
If No GDP Growth for Brazil after 1990: 
North-South  22.1 22.1 21.7    21.5 21.5 20.9 20.2 19.5 18.7    17.9    17.2 16.5 
North/Large Three  39.3 33.3 30.8    29.6 28.5 27.1 26.0 24.6 23.1    21.3    19.9 17.9 
North/Brazil  6.7  7.7  9.4   9.6  9.8  10.1 10.4 10.8 11.1    11.5    11.5 11.1 
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Table 2-9: Projections of the North-South Gap in GDP/Capita out to 2030 under an 
Assumption that GDP and Population Keep Growing at Average Rates as through 1990 and 
2009 
  In Constant 2000 USD  In PPP Constant 2005 Int’l $ 
    2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
North/South 15.9 15.6  13.9  12.5 11.2 10.0 6.5 6.4 5.8    5.2    4.7 4.2 
North/Large Three  16.6 15.8  12.7  10.1 8.1 6.5 6.7 6.4 5.1    4.0    3.2 2.5 
North/China 13.1 12.1  8.3  5.7 3.9 2.7 5.5 5.1 3.5    2.4    1.7 1.2 
North/India 38.1 36.7  30.6  25.5 21.2 17.7 11.4  11.0  9.2   7.7   6.5  5.4 
North/Brazil 6.5 6.5  6.5  6.5 6.4 6.4 3.6 3.6 3.6    3.6    3.6 3.6 







Table 2-10: Projections of North-South Gap in GDP/Capita out to 2030 under an 
Assumption that Gaps Narrow at the Same Speed as between 1990 and 2009 
  In Constant 2000 USD  In PPP Constant 2005 Int’l $ 
    2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
North/South 15.9 15.8  14.1  12.7  11.3  10.1  6.5  6.5  5.8   5.3   4.8  4.3 
North/Large Three  16.6 16.2    13.0  10.4  8.3 6.6 6.7 6.6 5.2    4.1    3.3 2.6 
North/China 13.1 12.6    8.7 6.0 4.1 2.8 5.5 5.3 3.6    2.5    1.7 1.2 
North/India 38.1 37.6  31.3  26.1  21.7  18.1  11.4  11.2  9.4   7.9   6.6  5.5 
North/Brazil 6.5 6.5    6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 3.6 3.6 3.6    3.6    3.6 3.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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The picture is similar to the projection above. All gaps except North‐Brazil gap 
narrow quickly from 2010 to 2030, the North‐China gap narrows the most quickly. 





between  2003  and  2030  Rich/Rest  GDP  per  capita  spread  (in  1990  international 
dollars)  will  narrow  from  6.1:1  to  4.4:1,  a  26%  fall.  Our  projections  suggest  that 
North‐South GDP per capita will narrow by 34% between 2009 and 2030. Also our 




2020  and  to  3.6%  per  year  from  2020  and  2030.  The  deceleration  reflects  the 






















Table 3-1: Shares in World Trade
1 1960s-2009 (%) 
  Shares  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 2000 2005 2009 
North  76.1 76.2 77.7 78.8 69.1 82.3 75.8  69.6  64.4 
G7  52.8 52.2 53.4 50.7 41.8 55.0 48.8  42.2  37.3 
Rest of North  23.3 24.0 24.3 28.1 27.2 27.4 27.0  27.4  27.1 
South  23.9 23.8 22.3 21.2 30.9 17.7 24.2  30.4  35.6 
Largest  Three  3.3 2.7 3.3 4.3 9.1 3.2 5.3  8.9  11.8 
China  1.2 0.9 1.6 2.7 6.8 1.7 3.7  6.8  8.9 
India  1.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.7  1.2  1.7 
Brazil  0.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9  0.9  1.2 
Oil Exporters  4.5 8.1 6.5 4.2 6.5 4.1 4.8  6.5  7.5 
Rest of South  16.1 13.1 12.5 12.7 15.3 10.4 14.1  15.0  16.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  





















Table 3-2: Shares in World Trade
1 1990-2009 (%) 
Shares\Year  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  82.3 78.4 75.8 75.2 74.4 73.6 71.8 69.6 68.1 66.6 64.4 64.4 
G7  55.0 49.4 48.8 48.2 46.9 45.5 43.8 42.2 41.1 39.5 37.6 37.3 
Rest  of  North  27.4 29.0 27.0 27.0 27.5 28.1 27.9 27.4 27.0 27.1 26.7 27.1 
South  17.7 21.6 24.2 24.8 25.6 26.4 28.2 30.4 31.9 33.4 35.6 35.6 
Largest  Three 3.2 4.4 5.3 5.8 6.5 7.3 8.2 8.9 9.6  10.3  10.8  11.8 
China  1.7 2.8 3.7 4.1 4.8 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.0 8.9 
India  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 
Brazil  0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 
Oil  Exporters 4.1 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.5 6.5 6.9 7.2 8.3 7.5 
Rest  of  South  10.4 12.9 14.1 14.2 14.4 14.2 14.5 15.0 15.4 15.9 16.5 16.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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low  as  17.7%;  the  lowest  point  over  the  last  five  decades.  Since  1990,  however, 
Southern trade has grown at rates significantly above both world and Northern trade 
and this has lead to an expansion in the Southern share in world trade from 17.7% in 





Table 3-3: Growth Rates of Trade
1 1960s-2009 (%) 
    1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  9.7  19.6  6.1 5.3 5.6  12.7  13.0  11.5  -22.8 
G7  9.6  19.4  5.9 4.9 4.4  12.3  10.9  9.9  -23.6 
Rest  of  North  9.8  19.9  6.7 6.1 7.6  13.4  16.2  13.8  -21.8 
South 5.7  22.3  0.5  8.9  12.3  20.6  20.7  23.4  -22.9 
Largest Three  1.3  21.4  7.4  11.1  17.5  23.3  23.9  21.7  -16.0 
China  -2.0 22.9 12.7 13.5 18.6 23.8 23.6  17.8  -13.9 
India 1.2  17.4  5.0  7.9  17.9  23.8  26.4  35.9  -20.1 
Brazil 5.9  22.6  2.1  7.1  10.8  19.1  23.0  32.4  -24.6 
Oil Exporters  7.6  30.5  -6.1  5.6  13.1  22.1  20.7  32.9  -30.8 
Rest  of  South  6.2  18.7  2.4 9.3 9.4  18.4  18.8  20.2  -23.5 
World  8.7  20.2  4.8 6.0 7.6  12.7  13.0  11.5  -22.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
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to 1.2% in 2009.          
Through their trade and GDP growth Brazil, China and India have evolved as 














Table 3-4: Shares in World Exports 1990-2009 (%) 
Shares\Year  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  81.4 78.7 74.1 74.0 73.1 72.1 70.3 67.3 65.4 64.4 62.0 62.8 
G7  54.7 49.9 46.7 46.3 44.8 43.3 41.6 39.3 38.1 37.1 35.3 35.2 
Rest  of  North  26.7 28.9 27.4 27.7 28.4 28.8 28.6 27.9 27.3 27.3 26.8 27.7 
South  18.6 21.3 25.9 26.0 26.9 27.9 29.7 32.7 34.6 35.6 38.0 37.2 
Largest  Three  3.4 4.5 5.5 6.1 6.9 7.7 8.5 9.5  10.3  11.1  11.5  12.3 
China  1.9 2.9 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.9 6.6 7.4 8.2 8.9 9.0 9.8 
India  0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Brazil  1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Oil  Exporters  5.3 5.0 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.4 7.3 8.8 9.4 9.5  11.0  9.1 
Rest  of  South  9.9  11.8 13.8 13.9 14.0 13.8 14.0 14.4 14.8 15.0 15.5 15.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
 
Tables  3‐4  and  3‐5  report  North,  South  and  Subgroup  shares  in  world 
exports  and  imports  between  1990  and  2009.  The  shares  of  both  exports  and 
imports are about the same as the total trade shares presented in Table 3‐2. Since 
                                                        
1 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
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1990 the Large Three have a higher share in world exports than in world imports. In 




Table 3-5: Shares in World Imports 1990-2009 (%) 
Shares\Year  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  83.3 78.2 77.4 76.3 75.7 75.0 73.2 71.8 70.7 68.9 66.6 65.9 
G7  55.2 49.0 50.8 50.1 48.9 47.6 46.0 44.9 44.1 41.9 39.9 39.3 
Rest  of  North  28.0 29.1 26.5 26.3 26.8 27.3 27.3 26.9 26.6 27.0 26.7 26.6 
South  16.7 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.3 25.0 26.8 28.2 29.3 31.1 33.4 34.1 
Largest  Three  2.9 4.3 5.2 5.6 6.1 7.0 7.8 8.3 8.8 9.4  10.1  11.2 
China  1.6 2.6 3.5 3.9 4.5 5.4 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.0 8.1 
India  0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.0 
Brazil  0.7 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Oil  Exporters  3.0 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.4 5.0 5.7 5.8 
Rest  of  South  10.8 14.0 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.5 15.1 15.6 16.0 16.7 17.6 17.1 
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1990, Southern shares in world trade would have been increased from 17.7% in 1990 
to 31.9% in 2009. Actual Southern shares increased from 17.7% to 35.6%. Under this 






Table 3-6: Counterfactual North and South Shares in World Trade
1 between 1990 and 2009 
under the Hypotheses that the Large Three Grew Alternatively as the South, the World, the 
South Excluding the Large Three, and Zero after 1990 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Shares: 
North   82.3 78.4 75.8 75.2 74.4 73.6  71.8 69.6 68.1 66.6 64.4 64.4 
South   17.7 21.6 24.2 24.8 25.6 26.4  28.2 30.4 31.9 33.4 35.6 35.6 
If Trade of the Large Three Grew as the South after 1990: 
North    82.3 78.9 76.5 76.2 75.9 75.5 74.1 72.1 70.8 69.6 67.3 68.1 
South    17.7 21.1 23.5 23.8 24.1 24.5 25.9 27.9 29.2 30.4 32.7 31.9 
If Trade of the Large Three Grew as the World after 1990: 
North    82.3 79.4 77.5 77.2 77.0 76.8 75.5 73.8 72.8 71.7 69.7 70.4 
South    17.7 20.6 22.5 22.8 23.0 23.2 24.5 26.2 27.2 28.3 30.3 29.6 
If Trade of the Large Three Grew as the South Excluding the Large Three after 1990: 
North    82.3 79.0 76.7 76.5 76.2 76.0 74.6 72.6 71.5 70.3 68.0 68.9 
South    17.7 21.0 23.3 23.5 23.8 24.0 25.4 27.4 28.5 29.7 32.0 31.1 
If No Trade Growth for the Large Three after 1990: 
North    82.3 80.3 78.7 78.4 78.2 78.2 77.2 75.5 74.6 73.6 71.6 72.3 
South    17.7 19.7 21.3 21.6 21.8 21.8 22.8 24.5 25.4 26.4 28.4 27.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
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each country separately to expanding Southern shares in world trade. 
 
Table 3-7: Counterfactual North and South Shares in World Trade
1 between 1990 and 2009 
under the Hypotheses that Individual Countries Grew Alternatively as the World and Zero 
after 1990 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Shares: 
North  82.3 78.4 75.8 75.2 74.4 73.6  71.8 69.6 68.1 66.6 64.4 64.4 
South  17.7 21.6 24.2 24.8 25.6 26.4  28.2 30.4 31.9 33.4 35.6 35.6 
China 1.7 2.8 3.7 4.1 4.8 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.0 8.9 
India  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 
Brazil 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 
If Trade of China Grew as the World after 1990: 
North  82.3 79.3 77.3 77.0 76.8  76.6 75.2 73.3 72.1 71.0 68.7 69.4 
South  17.7 20.7 22.7 23.0 23.2  23.4 24.8 26.7 27.9 29.0 31.3 30.6 
If Trade of India Grew as the World after 1990: 
North  82.3 78.5 75.9 75.3 74.6  73.7 72.0 69.9 68.5 67.1 65.0 65.1 
South  17.7 21.5 24.1 24.7 25.4  26.3 28.0 30.1 31.5 32.9 35.0 34.9 
If Trade of Brazil Grew as the World after 1990: 
North  82.3 78.6 75.8 75.3 74.5  73.6 71.8 69.6 68.2 66.8 64.6 64.6 
South  17.7 21.4 24.2 24.7 25.5  26.4 28.2 30.4 31.8 33.2 35.4 35.4 
If No Trade Growth for China after 1990: 
North  82.3 79.7 78.0 77.7 77.5  77.3 76.1 74.2 73.1 72.0 69.7 70.3 
South  17.7 20.3 22.0 22.3 22.5  22.7 23.9 25.8 26.9 28.0 30.3 29.7 
If No Trade Growth for India after 1990: 
North  82.3 78.6 76.1 75.5 74.8  74.0 72.3 70.2 68.8 67.5 65.3 65.4 
South  17.7 21.4 23.9 24.5 25.2  26.0 27.7 29.8 31.2 32.5 34.7 34.6 
If No Trade Growth for Brazil after 1990: 
North  82.3 78.8 76.1 75.6 74.7  73.9 72.2 70.0 68.6 67.2 65.0 65.0 
South  17.7 21.2 23.9 24.4 25.3  26.1 27.8 30.0 31.4 32.8 35.0 35.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 






























Table 4-1: North and South Shares in Stock Market Capitalization 1990 - 2009 (%) 
  1990s 2000s 1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  94.9  86.4 96.5 93.3 97.0 93.1 90.7 88.9 86.5 77.7 82.0 76.5 
G7  82.6  69.8 85.8 81.0 84.2 79.5 75.2 73.1 68.6 59.0 64.0 56.8 
Rest  of  North  12.3  16.6 10.7 12.3 12.8 13.7 15.5 15.8 17.8 18.7 18.0 19.8 
South  5.1 13.6 3.5 6.7 3.0 6.9 9.3  11.1  13.5  22.3  18.0  23.5 
Large  Three  0.8  7.6 0.1 0.9 0.7 3.6 4.1 4.5 6.5  14.5  10.7  15.1 
China  0.0  3.3 NA NA NA 2.0 1.2 0.9 2.2 6.9 5.3 7.3 
India  0.0  2.9 NA NA NA 1.1 2.0 2.5 3.0 5.4 3.7 5.2 
Brazil  0.8  1.4 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.3 2.1 1.8 2.7 
Oil  Exporters 0.0  1.7 NA 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.8 1.9 2.3 
Rest  of  South 4.3  4.3 3.4 5.8 2.2 2.6 3.9 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.0 
Note: Here we use as domestic market capitalization the total number of issued shares of domestic 
companies, including their several classes, multiplied by their respective prices at year-end. 
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1990  but  had  only  13  listed  companies  at  the  beginning.  China’s  stock  market 
experienced  violent  ups  and  downs  and  initially  failed  to  provide  a  significant 
financing source. But with the enforcement of Securities Laws in 1999, Accounting 







groups  /countries  all  experienced  positive  growth  between  2003  and  2007.  The 
difference  lays  in  the  feature  that  growth  in  capitalization  of  the  North,  G7,  oil 
exporters and Rest of South decelerated while others accelerated over this period. The 
capitalization of all groups (countries) dropped sharply in 2008 and rebounded strongly in 
2009. The capitalization of China grew the most rapidly in 2006 and 2007 while Brazil 
rebounded the most quickly in 2009.  
 
Table 4-2: Annual Growth Rates of North and South in Stock Market Capitalization (%) 
  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North   19  -11  -14  -17 35  18  12  20  9  -45  36 
G7 20  -11  -14  -18 33  16  11  16  5  -43  29 
Rest of North  14  -9  -13  -9  48  26  17  39  28  -50  60 
South 2  -21  0  72  67  34  36  50  101  -58  90 
Large Three    -22 -1  -18  344 54  20  27  77  170  -61  106
China  NA  NA  NA  NA  11  -13 -10 185 291  -60  101
India  NA  NA  NA  NA  119 41  43  49  118  -64  103
Brazil -22 -1  -18  -35 86  46  44  50  93  -57  126
Oil Exporters  177 -66  2091  13  122 56  89  32  43  -65  76 
Rest of South    7  -26  -13  0  71  44  28  31  32  -44  62 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from World Federation of Exchanges. 
 
   Table  4‐3  reports  counterfactual  analysis  of  the  North‐South  gap  in 
capitalization  assuming  that  the  capitalization  of  Large  Three  grew  as  the  world, 
South,  South  excluding  the  Large  Three  and  zero  after  2002.  Under  all  these 
                                                        
1 Source: http://money.cnfol.com/100621/160,1538,7887162,00.shtml.  










Table 4-3: Counterfactual North-South Gaps in Capitalization under the Hypotheses that 
the Capitalization of the Large Three Grew Alternatively as the South, the World, the South 
Excluding the Large Three, and Zero after 2002 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Gap: 
North/South 13.6  11.0  9.7  8.0  6.4  3.5  4.5  3.3 
North/Large Three  25.9  22.8  22.4  19.7 13.3  5.4  7.6  5.1 
If Capitalization of the Large Three Grew as the South after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  10.6  8.9  7.1  6.1  4.0  4.9  3.7 
North/Large Three  25.9  21.0  18.5  15.2 12.1  6.6  8.6  6.2 
If Capitalization of the Large Three Grew as the World after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  11.6  10.2  8.7  8.1  6.8  7.5  6.4 
North/Large Three  25.9  25.4  25.2  24.7 24.0  21.6  22.8  21.2 
If Capitalization of the Large Three Grew as the South Excluding the Large Three after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  10.2  8.1  6.4  5.8  4.7  5.3  4.4 
North/Large Three  25.9  19.3  15.5  12.1 11.1  8.9  10.1  8.3 
If No Capitalization Growth for the Large Three after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  13.3  12.1  10.4 10.1  8.5  8.4  7.7 
North/Large Three  25.9  35.0  41.3  46.3 55.3  60.5  33.4  45.5 
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wider than actual gaps. Among the three countries, China contributes the most and 





Table 4-4: Counterfactual North-South Gaps in Capitalization under Hypotheses that 
Capitalization of Individual Countries Grew Alternatively as the World or Zero after 2002 (%) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual Gap: 
North/South 13.6  11.0  9.7  8.0  6.4  3.5  4.5  3.3 
North/Large Three  25.9  22.8  22.4  19.7 13.3  5.4  7.6  5.1 
If Capitalization of China Grew as the World after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  10.6  8.9  7.3  6.5  4.5  5.6  4.2 
North/Large Three  25.9  20.8  18.6  15.9 13.6  8.1  11.0  7.7 
If Capitalization of India Grew as the World after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  11.9  10.8  9.2  7.5  4.3  5.3  4.0 
North/Large Three  25.9  27.0  29.1  28.7 19.0  7.7  10.1  6.9 
If Capitalization of Brazil Grew as the World after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  11.3  10.1  8.4  6.8  3.7  4.9  3.6 
North/Large Three  25.9  23.9  24.5  22.5 15.2  6.0  8.6  5.9 
If No Capitalization Growth for China after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  11.3  9.7  7.9  7.1  4.8  5.8  4.5 
North/Large Three  25.9  23.7  22.2  19.1 16.6  9.4  12.0  8.7 
If No Capitalization Growth for India after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  12.4  11.4  9.7  7.9  4.5  5.4  4.1 
North/Large Three  25.9  29.5  33.5  34.2 21.8  8.2  10.6  7.3 
If No Capitalization Growth for Brazil after 2002: 
North/South 13.6  11.5  10.3  8.6  7.0  3.8  4.9  3.6 
North/Large Three  25.9  24.9  25.9  24.0 16.0  6.2  8.8  6.0 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
 










Table 4-5: North and South Proportions in World FDI Inflows 1980-2009 (%) 
  1980s 1990s  2000s  1990  1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
North  81.2  73.0  67.4 87.9 68.1 86.7 65.9 68.0 67.6 56.3 55.7 
G7  58.2  43.3  39.4 54.5 37.5 54.4 46.8 42.0 37.9 33.9 29.8 
Rest of North  23.0  29.7  28.0  33.4  30.6  32.2  19.0  26.0  29.7  22.4  25.9 
South  18.8  27.0  32.6 12.1 31.9 13.3 34.1 32.0 32.4 43.7 44.3 
Large  Three  3.7  10.1  9.3 2.3  12.9  5.5 9.6 7.7 6.8  10.9  14.0 
China  1.7  7.2  5.9 1.7  11.0  2.9 7.3 5.0 4.0 6.1 8.5 
India  0.1  0.4  1.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.2 2.3 3.1 
Brazil  1.9  2.5  2.1 0.5 1.3 2.3 1.5 1.3 1.6 2.5 2.3 
Oil  Exporters  3.2  1.8  5.8 0.8 1.8 0.7 6.0 6.3 5.9 9.4  10.1 
Rest of South    12.0  15.1  17.6  9.0  17.2  7.1  18.5  18.0  19.8  23.4  20.2 




Large  Three  have  seen  a  rapid  increase  in  outward  investment.  The  outward 
investment  of  China  and  India  increased  57  times  and  2482  times  respectively 
between 1990 and 2009 (India’s outward investments grew from a small base and 
reached only one‐third of China’s investment in 2009).  














respectively.  If  measured  in  PPP  terms,  North‐South  gap  in  GDP/capita  narrowed 
from 8.9 in 1990 to 6.5 in 2009, which is close but bigger than estimates made by 














2009.  Brazil,  China  and  India  together  contributed  around  three  fourths  of  the 
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